Abstract
Introduction
Two main complementary views of informality can be found in the literature: exclusion and exit (Perry et al. 2007 ). The exclusion view sees informality as the result of burdensome regulations that prevent small firms from entering the formal sector (e.g. de Soto 1989) . 1 The exit view of informality, which can be seen as more encompassing, suggests that informality stems from a deliberate private decision, after cost-benefit analysis by firms (see e.g. Maloney 2004; de Mel et al. 2011) . 2 If this is the case, efforts to uncover the positive effects of formalisation can create incentives for firms to shift out of informality (Rand and Torm 2012) , and provide supporting evidence to policy-makers for promoting formalisation.
Several reasons may explain a firm's decision to formalise or not; including ignorance of legal obligations, initial reason for setting up a business (whether it is a real choice or by constraint), protection from corruption, expected access to market and larger business orders, or access to better location (see Cling et al., 2012 on the Vietnamese case). 3 In Hanoi and HCMC (Vietnam), over 80% of formal firms sees registration as beneficial, while nearly 50% of informal firms see no value to it (Cling et al., 2012) . Such a large difference between the real advantages of registration (given by formal firms) and the perceived benefits of registration for informal firms provides additional ground for trying to unveil the potential benefits of formalisation.
However, analysing the effects of formalisation on the performance of existing informal firms has been challenging due to unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, firms choosing to formalise may have different underlying characteristics, such as the owner's abilities, business practices or firm preferences, compared to the ones that remained informal. A first objective of this paper is to analyse the consequences of formalisation on the performance of informal firms opting out of informality, while accounting for unobserved heterogeneity (which may explain selfselection into the formal sector). In this regard, it is worth stressing that this paper is not analysing the causes of formalisation. 4 Second, we analyse the effects of formalisation over time to show that they are long-lasting; an aspect that is absent in most previous studies. Finally, we look at some channels (discussed in the literature) that could help explain the impact of formalisation on firm performance; looking at the situation before and after switching. This paper uses a panel dataset constructed from 5 small and medium enterprises (SME) surveys in Vietnam, conducted over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . The dataset remains unique by the number of survey years (5) , the number of firms, and its focus on the informal sector. We define formal firms as those that are registered to pay taxes (i.e. have a tax code), a common indicator of formality in the literature (Fajnzylber et al. 2009 ; McKenzie and Sakho 2010; Rand and Torm 2012) . Via the formal status variable (Status equals 0 if a firm is informal, and 1 if formal), we construct a variable, Switcher, which equals 1 for all years in which a firm that opted out of the informal sector has been observed in our panel dataset, irrespective of the year it became formal; 0 if the firm remained informal throughout the survey periods. This dummy variable allows us to differentiate between always informal and switching firms explicitly.
We find that switching firms have higher profit and value added compared to informal nonswitching firms. Such heterogeneity is typically assumed but not assessed in most previous studies. Becoming formal leads to a further increase in switching firms' profit and value added. Specifically, formalisation increases switchers' profit and value added by respectively 11.0 per cent and 8.9 per cent, compared to when they were informal. The benefits of formalisation exist in the short term (1 year) and persist over the longer term (3 or more years). These benefits run through channels such as better access to powered equipment, increased customer base, more advertising, and higher business association membership. However, we find no evidence of increased access to credit or increased likelihood to apply for formal loans.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly presents an overview of the existing literature on the impact of formalisation. In Section 3, we describe the dataset. Section 4 discusses the econometric approach, while Section 5 presents the main empirical results. We conclude in Section 6.
Literature review
The literature on the consequences of formalisation on firm performance can be divided into two main categories: non-experimental and experimental studies. The first category mainly uses cross-sectional data and have relied on one or a combination of methods such as difference-in-differences, matching, instrumental variables, or regression discontinuity. The majority of these studies find that formalisation has a positive impact on firm performance (see e.g. Using firm-level cross-section data from Mexico, Fajnzylber et al. (2009) show that being formal increases profit by at least 20 per cent. Their approaches rely on matching under the assumptions that formal status is determined by a set of observable variables and on a control function approach. 5 If selection into formality is based partly on unobserved characteristics, this may lead to overestimating the effects of formalisation (McKenzie and Sakho 2010). Fajnzylber et al. (2011) used regression discontinuity and difference-in-differences to compare firms that were created immediately before and after a business tax reduction and simplification scheme (SIMPLES) in Brazil. They found that this reform led to increased levels of registration and to higher revenue, profit and employment among registered firms. As Fajnzylber et al. (2011) concentrate on newly created firms that opt for operating formally, not existing informal sector firms, the results can simply reflect self-selection at formal sector entry.
Monteiro and Assunção (2012) use a 1997 cross-sectional survey of micro and small firms, just after the implementation of SIMPLES. Using a difference-in-differences approach, they compare the legal status of firms created before and after the programme, in sectors affected and those not affected by the SIMPLES reform. They found an increase of 13 percentage points in the registration of retail firms, but no effect is found for other eligible sectors, such as construction, manufacturing, transportation, and services. The authors cannot rule out that the effect on the retail sector could be generated by a specific sectoral shock coincident with the SIMPLES reform.
McKenzie and Sakho (2010) estimate the impact of tax registration on firm profit in Bolivia, by using the distance between firm and registration office as an instrument for registration status. 6 The assumption is that being closer to tax office increases the probability of registration. They find that the overall impact of tax registration is positive but heterogeneous; it leads to higher profits for medium-size firms in their sample, but has a negative impact on small and large firms. They also find that owners of larger informal firms have higher entrepreneurial abilities than owners of larger formal firms, in contrast to the mainstream view (see for instance La Porta and Shleifer 2008).
An exception to the use of cross-section data is Rand and Torm (2012) who use a matched double-difference with the same panel data as in this study, but for 2007 and 2009 only. They find that registration leads to an increase in firm profits, investments, and access to credit for Vietnamese SMEs; and to a decrease in the use of casual labour, indicating higher compliance with labour regulations. Compared to Rand and Torm (2012) , the present study extends the panel dataset up to 5 observations per firm. As a result, we are able to estimate the effects of formalisation in the short but also in the medium term; an aspect that is missing in Rand and Torm's study.
A second strand of the literature on the effects of formalisation on firm performance uses the experimental approach. This recent experimental evidence suggests that the costs of formalisation outweigh the benefits, resulting in many firms remaining informal despite incentives to formalise. De Andrade et al. (2016) conducted a field experiment, in Brazil, to examine government actions that promote registration of informal firms. Firms were randomly assigned to a control group or one of four treatment groups: the first received information about how to formalise; the second received this information and free registration costs, along with the use of an accountant for a year; the third group was assigned to receive an enforcement visit from a municipal inspector; and the fourth group was assigned to have a neighbouring firm receive an enforcement visit to see if enforcement has spillovers. Receiving an inspection increases registration probability by 21 to 27 percentage points, but the three other interventions had no effect. This could suggest that informal firms formalise mostly when forced to do so. randomly assigned 520 firms to 5 groups. They find that simply reimbursing the direct costs of registration had no effect on formalisation. When offered an amount equivalent to one-half up to one month's worth of the median firm's profit, 20 per cent of firms registered; and 47 per cent registered when offered payments corresponding to two months of the median firm's profit. In follow-up surveys, firms that formalised were found to have higher profits, but this result was driven by a few fast-growing firms: formalizing had no effect on the profits of the majority. Jaramillo (2009) reports an experiment in Lima, Peru, where registration was promoted by subsidising the full money cost and providing guidance through the process. Although most firms reported greater disadvantages than advantages of being informal, only one out of four firms opted to formalise despite the incentive. This suggests that formalisation is simply not desirable for some firms.
Relative to transmission channels, formalisation is assumed to benefit the firms through increased access to credit, greater opportunities to engage with large firms and the government, or greater access to training and support programmes (Joshi et al. 2012) ; but the existing evidence is mixed. McKenzie and Sakho (2010) find that higher profits due to registration appear to come mainly from increase in customer base; and there was no impact of formalisation on the prospect of obtaining a bank loan. Fajnzylber et al. (2011) argue that improvements occur, not through access to credit or contracts with larger firms, but through lower cost of contracting labour, leading to the adoption of production techniques involving a permanent location and a larger paid labour force. Likewise, Rand and Torm (2012) could not obtain decisive evidence on the positive impact of formalisation on access to credit. De Andrade et al. (2016) find that registration increases advertising and use of receipt books, but not the likelihood of receiving government contracts, of using bank accounts or loans, or of participating in government programmes. According to Bruhn and McKenzie (2014) , the likely explanation is that many informal firms would not receive credit or are unlikely to sell to the government anyway, even if they did register; and those firms that are in a position to do so, formalise when this need arises. Regarding the transmission channels, a distinctive aspect of this paper, relative to previous studies, is to compare the situation before and after formalisation, in order to ascertain that formalisation really had an impact on the transmission channel under consideration.
Data
Our dataset comes from SME surveys conducted in . A representative sample of registered household and non-household firms was drawn from this population, using a stratified sampling procedure. The aim was to ensure the inclusion of an adequate number of enterprises in each province with different ownership forms, such as officially registered households, private firms, co-operatives, or limited liability companies. For reasons of implementation, the survey was confined to specific areas in each province/city. In addition, the GSO enterprise census focused only on 'visible' firms (those with fixed professional premises), which resulted in an underestimation of household firms.
Informal household firms were included in the SME survey based on random on-site identification within the survey districts observed by the enumerator. With such an identification approach, the informal firms included in the survey are those operating alongside officially registered enterprises. These informal firms may be relatively more competitive (and profitable) compared to informal firms clustering in areas with none or very few formal firms (see Rand and Torm 2012) . In this regard, the sample of informal firms may not be fully representative of the informal sector as a whole in Vietnam.
Our total sample of firms with at least two observations includes always formal firms (1989 or 59.5% of total), switchers (458 or 13.7% of total) and always informal firms (896 or 26.8% of total). 7 For this study, we restrict the sample to informal or switching firms with at least two observations, resulting in a total of about 4800 observations (1300 firms) in the dataset. Out of these 1300 firms, 551 firms (42%) have observations in all 5 surveys, 173 firms (13%) have four observations, 294 (23%) have three observations, and 282 (22%) have two observations. In a subsequent section, we check the robustness of our results to attrition bias given its significance. As shown in Table 1 , the sample is dominated by informal non-switching firms, which account for 67 per cent of the total number of firms; with switchers thus accounting for 33 per cent.
Empirical approach
To examine the effects of formalisation on firm performance, we exploit the panel nature our dataset to estimate a fixed-effects (FE) model using the following equation:
The dependent variable represents two performance indicators, namely total gross profitand total value added.
is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a firm is formal (0 if informal). In addition to these variables, we consider several control variables derived mainly from Rand and Torm (2012) . The control variables include the gender of the owner/manager (0 if male, 1 otherwise); the education level of the owner/manager (0 if secondary school not completed, 1 otherwise) as a proxy for owner/manager's human capital; the number of regular full-time employees (in log), as well as the square, to control for firm size effects (McKenzie and Sakho 2010); the share of production and service workers (as opposed to white-collar workers) to control for the average skill level in the firm, which can have an impact on firm performance (Rand and Torm 2012) ; the share of female workers, which has been shown to depress wage levels in firms, thereby affecting performance (Larsen et al. 2011 ); whether or not a firm owns a Certificate of Land Use Right (CLUR) to proxy property rights 8 ; government inspection visits (0 if the firm has received no inspection in a given year, 1 if the number of inspection is equal to or more than 1); and dummy variables to control for industry, location, and time factors. The industry dummy variable equals 0 if the firm is in low-technology manufacturing, and 1 if the firm is in the medium-low or medium-high technology category. We also estimate a second equation using a random-effects (RE) model:
As highlighted in the introduction, one key difficulty in identifying the impact of formalisation on firm performance is that switching and always informal firms may not be comparable due to unobserved firm heterogeneity that is most likely to determine which firms switch and which firms do not. To address this issue, we control for firm-type fixed effects by using the variable (0 if a firm is informal, and 1 if the firm is formal) to construct a variable, Switcher, denoted by . If a firm has shifted out of the informal sector, the Switcher variable equals 1 for all years in which the firm has been observed in our panel dataset, irrespective of the year the firm switched; 0 if the firm remained informal throughout the 5 surveys.
The inclusion of firm-type fixed effects in our regression model (using dummy variable ) enables us to account explicitly for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between always informal and switching firms. Specifically, captures observed and unobserved differences between the switchers and the informal non-switchers (baseline group), while the variable (0 if a firm is informal, and 1 if the firm is formal) captures the net effect of formalisation on firm performance. An implicit assumption is that formalisation happens randomly within the Switchers group.
It can be noted that the use of random effects (instead of fixed effects model) in our regression analysis is driven by the fact that the variable Switcher is time-constant (i.e. being an always informal or a switching firm). A possible downside of random effects modelling relates to the requirement that the firm-specific effect ( ) be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. As a result, for robustness check, we also use Mundlak's approach to correct for possible violation of the independence assumption between the covariates and the error term in the random effects model; through the inclusion of panel-group means of time-varying variables (see e.g. Bell and Jones 2015; Mundlak 1978). 10 
Results
In this section, we present results relative to the impact of formalisation on firm performance, as well as the time effects of formalisation. Note that the below discussion is based on estimates from the 'standard' random effects regression. We end this section by discussing possible transmission channels. Table 2 describes the dependent and independent variables per firm type (always informal or switching). We find that the average profit and value added of switchers is significantly higher than that of informal non-switchers (at the 1% level). Switchers are also significantly more likely to have a higher share of production workers; employ a higher number of full-time workers; receive more government inspections; and have an owner/manager who has completed secondary school. In constrast, informal non-switchers are significantly more likely, than switchers, to have a higher share of female employees, a female owner/manager, and a CLUR. Table 3 shows the same variables as in Table 2 , but only for switchers, before and after switching. It shows that the average profit and value added of switchers increase after formalisation. Relative to control variables, we find that formalisation leads to a significant reduction in the share of production workers and the firm size. Such a result suggests that formalisation may lead to downsizing, in order to increase labor productivity in the switching firm. Formalisation also leads to a significant reduction in the likelihood of compliance inspections. But this is a surprising result since the likelihood of compliance inpections is significantly higher for always formal firms.
Dependent and Control Variables

Impact of formalisation on profit and value added
A first objective of this paper is to analyse the effects of formalisation on the performance of informal firms opting out of informality. In this regard, Table 4 shows FE, RE and Mundlak regressions for (log) total gross profit and (log) value added. Note that the results on the effects of formalisation do not change qualitatively if controls are introduced progressively.
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Our first result provides evidence that switching firms are different from informal nonswitching firms. Looking at the coefficient of Switcher (RE columns), we find that the profit and value added levels of switchers are significantly higher by respectively 21.8 per cent and 31.6 per cent compared to those of informal non-switchers. 12 In most of the previous studies, such a difference was assumed but not assessed. Thus, even before switching to the formal sector, switchers have higher profit and value added compared to informal non-switchers. Ignoring this difference (e.g. in OLS regressions) would lead to an overestimation of the effects of formalisation for switching firms. Our second result indicates that becoming formal leads to an increase in profit and value added, as shown by the coefficient of 'Switcher (after formalisation)'; and this can be considered the "net" effect of formalisation on switchers. Formalisation increases total amount of profit and value added of switchers significantly, by respectively 11.0 per cent and 8.9 per cent, compared to when they were informal. The results are comparable with either the FE, RE or Mundlak estimations.
Several other control variables are noteworthy in Table 4 . First, firm size has a significant positive impact on the amount of profit and value added; but at a decreasing rate. Second, the gender of the owner/manager is typically not a significant determinant of firm performance. Third, receiving at least one compliance inspection is positively related to profit and value added. Although this may seem counterintuitive, it may be the case that inspections enhance labour productivity by forcing firms to comply with labour regulations, thereby attracting more productive workers, as suggested by Rand and Torm (2012) ; or inspections may improve product quality by pushing firms to comply with hygiene and safety standards. Whether the owner or manager of the firm has completed secondary school matters positively; highlighting the importance of human capital and skills.
Robustness check to endogeneity
In this section, we analyze the potential endogeneity of formalisation using a control function approach (see Wooldridge 2015 for details). In a first step, we estimate the clustered Probit model based on the following equation:
Where 1[. ] is the binary indicator function; a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a firm is formal; control variables described earlier; the set of exogenous variables that are omitted from Equations 1 and 2, and that are partially correlated with formalisation; = ( , ); and an error term.
To construct , we compute the annual provincial-level averages for each of the three following binary variables: access to powered equipment (1 if access, 0 otherwise); compliance visits (0 if the firm has received no inspection in a given year, 1 if the number of inspection is equal to or more than 1); and bribe payments (1 if the firm has made any bribe payments in a given year, 0 otherwise). We use only always-formal firms and formalised firms (i.e. switchers). And for the latter, we exclude the year they become formal in our sample. Our assumption is that informal firms are more likely to formalise when they are able to observe some characteristics of formal firms and presumably attribute those characteristics to formalisation. The results are shown in Table 5 (column "Clustered Probit"). They suggest that compliance visits received and bribes paid by formal firms have negative and significant effects on the likelihood of formalisation; while access to powered equipment has a positive and significant impact.
In a second step, the results from Equation 3 are used to obtain "generalised residuals" as:
Finally, we re-estimated Equations 1 and 2 while adding ̂ as a regressor to control for endogeneity. The results are presented in Table 5 (columns FE and RE) and confirm that formalisation has a positive impact on switchers' profit and value added, compared to informal firms.
Robustness check to attrition bias
As mentioned in Section 3, there is significant attrition in our panel data. As a result, we checked the robustness of our results to attrition bias, a typical challenge in panel datasets. 13 We do so in 2 ways: a test suggested by Verbeek and Nijman (1992) and by varying the sample size. Together, these two checks suggest that our results are robust to attrition bias.
The test suggested by Verbeek and Nijman (1992) As a second check, we vary the sample size by using the full sample or keeping only firms with at least 3, 4, or 5 observations; noting that the results discussed in this paper are based on firms with at least 2 observations. The results are shown in Table 6 . They do not change qualitatively when the sample includes all firms, the balanced panel or only firms with at least 3 or 4 observations. Switching firms are different from informal non-switchers and the impact of formalisation is positive and significant at conventional levels.
Persistence of formalisation effects
A second objective of this study is to analyse the effects of formalisation over time, an aspect that is absent in most previous studies. Given that registration costs can affect performance (negatively) in the period immediately following formalisation, the potential benefits of formalisation can materialise with a delay. It is therefore important to analyse both the shortterm and longer-term effects of formalisation. Such an analysis can be valuable for firms that are considering to formalise as well as policy-makers trying to promote formalisation.
To analyse persistence, we constructed dummies for specific lengths of time (1, 3, and 5 or more) which measures the number of years since a firm has shifted out of the informal sector. Finally, for firms that became formal in 2011, the number of years since switching is 1 in 2011 and 3 in 2013, the year of the last survey. In total, the number of firms that switched from the informal to the formal sector for 1, 3, and 5 years or more is, respectively, 431, 321, and 269. 15 The results are shown in Table 7 ; for FE and RE models. For both profit and value added, we find that the coefficients are positive and significant for all lengths of time (1, 3, and 5 years or more. Our results are therefore supportive of the fact that the benefits of formalisation materialise in the short term (length 1) and persist over time (length 3 and length 5 years or more). Using a control function approach to control for endogeneity of formalisation in the first year does not change the results (see Appendix 2).
Transmission channels
There are a number of possible channels through which formality can have a positive impact on firm performance. These channels include access to credit, greater opportunities to engage with large firms and the government, greater access to training and support programmes (Joshi et al. 2012) ; the opportunity to enlarge customer base and lower the costs of corruption (McKenzie and Sakho 2010); or the ability to lower the cost of contracting labour (Fajnzylber et al. 2011 ). Previous studies have typically considered these transmission channels as conduits to higher firm performance; but, they may also constitute reasons why a firm may have switched out of the informal sector.
By considering the periods before and after formalisation, our analysis is useful in understanding whether the benefits expected from formalisation materialise or not for switching firms. In this section, we analyse the following channels: access to better equipment, access to a larger customer pool, access to formal credit, increased likelihood of applying to formal loans, access to business association membership, more advertising or less bribe payments (see Table 8 ).
Switchers' probability to access powered equipment (or both manual and powered equipment) increases significantly when they shift out of the informal sector. This result is explicable if formalisation leads also to better access to public utilities such as electricity. Access to better equipment can can improve productivitiy; and thereby performance. Being able to attract more customers can boost sales and increase profits. Customer base is a dummy variable taking value 0 if less than 20; 1 otherwise. Switchers' custormer base tends to be smaller than that of informal non-switching firms, before formalisation. After formalisation, the likelihood of having a larger customer base increases significantly, by 13 per cent. This suggests that some firms may switch out of the informal sector in order to alleviate the constraint of a small customer base. In contrast, Rand and Torm (2012) do not find any improvements along the customer base dimension of becoming formal in their study; while McKenzie and Sakho (2010) find a positive impact.
We find that the likelihood of accessing credit does not increase with formalisation; and this result is also found by Fajnzylber et al. (2011), McKenzie and Sakho (2010) and Rand and Torm (2012) . Still, compared to previous studies, we find that switchers have a greater probability of accessing formal loans before formalizing, compared to informal non-switchers. A similar result applies to formal loan applications: switchers are more likely to apply for formal loans than informal non-switchers, but only marginally (at the 10% level). Formalisation does not change their behaviour ( as in de Andrade et al., 2016) . It can be noted that in Vietnam, firms can use their CLUR to obtain formal credit, even when they are informal, partly explaining the previous results.
Our results suggest that switchers have an increased likelihood of being a member of a business association, which can introduce the entrepreneur to new technologies or ways of doing business (Fajnzylber et al. 2011 ), but only after they become formal (not before). The likelihood of advertising is higher for switchers, compared to informal non-switchers. This likelihood further increases after they shift out of the informal sector (see also de Andrade et al. 2016) . Similarly, we find that switchers' probability of bribe payments are higher compared to informal firms; and that formalisation leads to a further increase in the probability of paying bribes. This is in line with the fact that always formal firms (in our sample) have a significantly higher bribe payments than informal firms; but contrary to the assumption that firms may formalise to protect themselves from corruption (e.g. McKenzie and Sakho, 2010).
In summary, we find that formalisation can benefit informal firms through better access to improved equipment, larger customer base, advertising, and business association membership. However, we find no evidence of increased likelihood of applying for formal loans or improved access to credit, a key reason often put forward to explain the formalisation of informal firms. Formalisation also appears to increase the probability of bribe payments.
Conclusion
Using a panel dataset consisting of five waves of SME surveys in Vietnam, this paper analyses the impact of formalisation on firm performance, the persistence of these effects in the longer term, and the channels through which these impacts materialised. Such an analysis has been challenging because of potential selection bias, due to the fact that firms choosing to formalise can have different underlying characteristics, such as the owner's abilities or firm preferences, compared to those that remained informal.
To control for unobserved heterogeneity, we created a dummy variable that distinguishes between the two groups of firms: always informal and switchers. We find that switching firms perform better than informal non-switching firms. Such heterogeneity is typically assumed in most previous studies. Second, we find that becoming formal leads to a further increase in switching firms' profit and value added. Third, the benefits of formalisation materialise in the short term and persist over time. Finally, we show that the benefits of formalisation run through channels such as better access to powered equipment, increased customer base, more advertising, and higher business association membership. Yet, formalisation does not seem to improve access to credit or increase the likelihood to apply for formal loans.
Our results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that firms rationally make the decision to formalise by comparing the costs and the benefits. The firms that formalise, on average, made the right decision. Consequently, the results of this study highlight the need for a policy mix that reduces the cost of registration, showcases the potential benefits of formalisation, and further increases the attractiveness of the formal sector. The latter strategy could put into place supportive measures to facilitate access to credit, to modern production equipment, or business associations; or reduce the incidence of corruption. where , denotes the firm's profits if it is formally registered at time t, and , denotes the firm's profits if it is not formally registered at time t.
− denotes the utility benefit to firm owners from obeying the law and feeling they are contributing to national welfare through paying taxes.
, and denote the monetary, time, and information costs from registering. 3 Interestingly, no mention is made of past performance (such as past profit) has a driver for formalization, suggesting that firms may be forward-looking when deciding to formalize. 4 See e.g. Cling et al. (2012) for details on the causes of formalization in Vietnam. 5 Likewise, Sharma (2014) finds, through propensity score matching, that registration leads to significant gains in sales per employee and value added per employee in India. 6 See also de Vries (2010), who controls for self-selection by using the degree of value added tax compliance among the firm's suppliers and buyers as an instrument. He finds large differences in productivity when comparing formal retailers to informal ones in Brazil. 7 We assume that once a firm becomes formal, it stays formal; and recoded formality status accordingly. This applies to about 2.4% of observations of the initial total sample. The main justification is that once a firm enters tax authorities' records by acquiring a tax code, it becomes very difficult for the firm to move again into informality. 8 Rand and Torm (2012) typically control for this variable in their empirical model, based on the fact that even informal firms in Vietnam are generally able to use their CLUR as collateral for a loan, thereby easing potential financial constraints for increased investments and performance. 9 We use the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) technology classification. 10 Bell and Jones (2015) write the following: "The downside of Random Effects (RE) modelling -correlated lower-level covariates and higher-level residuals -is omitted-variable bias, solvable with Mundlak's (1978) formulation. Consequently, RE can provide everything that FE promises and more". Mundlak's approach is also discussed in some textbooks such as Baltagi (2008) or Wooldridge (2010). 11 Available upon request. 12 As we are using a semi-logarithmic functional form, we estimate the effect of a dummy variable coefficient on the dependent variable as:
where ĉ is the dummy variable coefficient and (ĉ) its variance (see Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980; Kennedy 1981) . Because informal firms in the sample may be relatively more competitive (and profitable) compared to the informal sector population, these estimates can be seen as lower bounds. 13 One possibility could have been to limit the analysis to the balanced panel as done by Rand and Torm (2012). 14 These numbers can also be interpreted in terms of ranges, that is, between 0 and 2 in 2007; between 2 and 4 in 2009; between 4 and 6 in 2011; and between 6 and 8 in 2013. 15 We merge firms that have been formal for 5 or 7 years into a single category: "5 years or more".
Tables
Note: all tables are based on authors' analyses using data and methods as described in the text. 
Note:
The time-series average of each variable is first calculated by firm, before the average group statistics are computed. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In Mundlak's model, the panel mean of independent variables is included in the regression, except: Switcher (from informal to formal). 
